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Abstract
The solution to a Nash or a nonsymmetric bargaining game is obtained by maximizing a
concave function over a convex set, i.e., it is the solution to a convex program. We show that
each 2-player game whose convex program has linear constraints, admits a rational solution
and such a solution can be found in polynomial time using only an LP solver. If in addition,
the game is succinct, i.e., the coefficients in its convex program are “small”, then its solution
can be found in strongly polynomial time. We also give a non-succinct linear game whose
solution can be found in strongly polynomial time.
1 Introduction
In game theory, 2-player games occupy a special place – not only because numerous applications
involve 2 players but also because they often have remarkable properties that are not possessed
by extensions to more players.
For instance, in the case of Nash equilibrium, the 2-player case is the most extensively studied
and used, and captures a rich set of possibilities, e.g., those encapsulated in canonical games
such as prisoner’s dilemma, battle of the sexes, chicken, and matching pennies. In terms of
properties, 2-player Nash equilibrium games always have rational solutions whereas games with
3 or more players may have only irrational solutions; an example of the latter, called “a three-
man poker game,” was given by Nash [Nas50b]). Finally, von Neumann’s minimax theorem
for 2-player zero-sum games yields a polynomial time algorithm using LP. On the other hand,
3-player zero-sum games are PPAD-hard, since 2-player non-zero-sum games can be reduced to
them; the reduction is due to [vNM44] and PPAD-hardness is due to [CDT09].
John Nash’s seminal paper defining the bargaining game dealt only with the case of 2-players
[Nas50a]. Later, it was observed that his entire setup, and theorem characterizing the bargaining
solution, easily generalize to the case of more than 2 players, e.g., see [Kal77].
Recently, Vazirani [Vaz09] initiated a systematic algorithmic study of Nash bargaining games
and also carried this program over to solving nonsymmetric bargaining games of Kalai [Kal77].
In this paper we carry the program further, though only for the case of 2-player games. Our
∗College of Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA 30332–0280, E-mail:
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findings indicate that this case exhibits a rich set of possibilities algorithmically and calls for a
further investigation.
The solution to a Nash or a nonsymmetric bargaining game is obtained by maximizing a concave
function over a convex set, i.e., it is the solution to a convex program. Two basic classes of these
games defined in [Vaz09] are NB and LNB. The convex program for a game in NB admits a
polynomial time separation oracle and hence its solution can be obtained to any desired accuracy
using the ellipsoid algorithm. All constraints in the convex program for a game in LNB are linear
and [Vaz09] gives combinatorial polynomial time algorithms for several games in this class; by a
combinatorial algorithm we mean an algorithm that performs an efficient search over a discrete
space. Let NB2 and LNB2, respectively, be the restrictions of these classes to 2-players games.
We show that for solving any game in LNB2, it is not essential to solve a convex program – an
LP solver suffices. As a consequence, all games in LNB2 have rational solutions; this property
does not hold for 3-player games in LNB. We then define a subclass of LNB2 called SLNB2,
consisting of succinct games, i.e., the coefficients in its convex program are “small”. We show
that all games in SLNB2 admit strongly polynomial algorithms; however, these algorithms are
not combinatorial. This class includes nontrivial and interesting games, e.g., the game DG2,
which consists of a directed graph with edge capacities and each player is a source-sink pair
desiring flow (see Section 3 for definition). This game is derived from Kelly’s flow markets
[Kel97].
Next, we ask if there is a game in (LNB2 - SLNB2) that admits a strongly polynomial time
algorithm. The answer turns out to be “yes”. We show that the 2-player version of the game
ADNB, for which a combinatorial polynomial time algorithm is given in [Vaz09], admits a
combinatorial strongly polynomial algorithm. This game is derived from the linear case of the
Arrow-Debreu market model (see Section 8 for definition).
Finally, we ask if there is a game in (NB2 - LNB2) that can be solved in polynomial time
without a convex program solver. Once again, the answer turns out to be “yes”. We give a
game whose solution reduces to solving a degree 4 equation. Alternatively, it also admits an
elegant geometric solution.
Our last 2 results raise interesting questions, e.g., is there a characterization of the subclass of
LNB2 which consists of all games that admit strongly polynomial algorithms? They also indicate
that the class NB2, in particular (NB2 - LNB2), may be worth exploring further algorithmically
and structurally, e.g., does (NB2 - LNB2) contain a game that always has a rational solution?
And are there 2-player games, not in NB2, whose solution can be computed in polynomial time?
Building on a remarkable convex program of Eisenberg and Gale [EG59], [JV08] gave the notion
of Eisenberg-Gale markets; see Section 5. In answering an open question of [JV08] affirmatively,
[CDV06] showed that EG(2) markets, i.e., the restriction of Eisenberg-Gale markets to 2 buyers,
always admit a rational solution and it can be found using only an LP solver. Our first result
is obtained by extending their algorithm. For the second result, we use the notion of a flexible
budget market given in [Vaz09]; see Section 8. We reduce ADNB2 to such a market and give a
combinatorial algorithm for finding an equilibrium in it.
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2 Nash and Nonsymmetric Bargaining Games
An n-person Nash bargaining game consists of a pair (N , c), where N ⊆ Rn+ is a compact,
convex set and c ∈ N . Set N is the feasible set and its elements give utilities that the n players
can simultaneously accrue. Point c is the disagreement point – it gives the utilities that the n
players obtain if they decide not to cooperate. The set of n agent will be denoted by B and the
agents will be numbered 1, 2, . . . n. Game (N , c) is said to be feasible if there is a point v ∈ N
such that ∀i ∈ B, vi > ci.
The solution to a feasible game is the point v ∈ N that satisfies the following four axioms:
1. Pareto optimality: No point in N can weakly dominate v.
2. Invariance under affine transformations of utilities:
3. Symmetry: The numbering of the players should not affect the solution.
4. Independence of irrelevant alternatives: If v is the solution for (N , c), and S ⊆ Rn+
is a compact, convex set satisfying c ∈ S and v ∈ S ⊆ N , then v is also the solution for
(S, c).
Via an elegant proof, Nash proved:
Theorem 1 Nash [Nas50a] If game (N , c) is feasible then there is a unique point in N satis-
fying the axioms stated above. This is also the unique point that maximizes Πi∈B(vi − ci), over
all v ∈ N .
Thus Nash’s solution involves maximizing a concave function over a convex domain, and is
therefore the optimal solution to the convex program that maximizes
∑
i∈B log(vi − ci) subject
to v ∈ N . As a consequence, if for a specific game, a separation oracle can be implemented in
polynomial time, then using the ellipsoid algorithm one can get as good an approximation to
the solution as desired [GLS88].
Kalai [Kal77] generalized Nash’s bargaining game by removing the axiom of symmetry and
showed that any solution to the resulting game is the unique point that maximizes Πi∈B(vi − ci)
pi ,
over all v ∈ N , for some choice of positive numbers pi, for i ∈ B, such that
∑
i∈B pi = 1.
Thus, any particular nonsymmetric bargaining solution is specified by giving the pi’s satisfying
the 2 conditions given above. For the purposes of computability, we will restrict to rational pi’s.
Equivalently, let us define the n-person nonsymmetric bargaining game as follows. Assume that
B,N , c are as defined above. In addition, we are given the clout1 of each player: a positive
integer wi for each player i. Assuming the game is feasible, the solution to this nonsymmetric
bargaining game is the unique point that maximizes Πi∈B(vi − ci)
wi , over all v ∈ N .
One more remark is in order. As shown by Kalai [Kal77], any nonsymmetric game can be
reduced to a Nash bargaining game over a larger number of players. However, this reduction is
not useful for our purpose because once the number of players increases, the special properties
of 2-player games are lost.
1The choice of the term “clout of a player” is justified by a theorem of Kalai stating that the solution to this
game corresponds precisely to the solution of a k-person game, with k =
∑
i∈B
wi, which is obtained by taking
wi copies of player i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
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3 The Classes NB2, LNB2 and SLNB2
Before defining the classes NB2 and LNB2, we recall the definition of the classes NB and LNB
from [Vaz09]. Let G be an n-person Nash or nonsymmetric bargaining game whose solution is
given by the optimal solution to the following convex program, where x arem auxiliary variables,
the functions fi are convex. (Clearly, G is a Nash bargaining game if each wi = 1.)
maximize
∑
i∈B
wi log(vi − ci) (1)
subject to for i = 1 . . . k : fi(v,x) ≤ 0
v ≥ 0
x ≥ 0
The game G is said to be in the class NB if each of the k constraints of program (1) can be
checked in polynomial time at any given point (v,x). This gives a separation oracle for the
program and therefore, using the ellipsoid algorithm, the Nash or nonsymmetric bargaining
solution to the game G can be obtained to any desired accuracy, assuming the game is feasible.
Furthermore, G is feasible iff the optimal solution to the following convex program is > 0, which
can also be checked in polynomial time.
maximize t (2)
subject to for i = 1 . . . n : vi ≥ ci + t
for i = 1 . . . k : fi(v,x) ≤ 0
v ≥ 0
x ≥ 0
The restriction of class NB to 2-player games yields the class NB2.
If all constraints in (1) are linear, then game G is said to be linear. If so, the constraints form a
polyhedron in Rn+m. Its projection on the first n coordinates, corresponding to v, is a polytope,
which is also the feasible set N . The class of these games is called linear Nash and nonsymmetric
bargaining games, and abbreviated to LNB.
Finally, the restriction of LNB to 2-player games gives us the class LNB2. We will assume
w.l.o.g. that the convex program for game G in LNB2 has the following form:
maximize
∑
i=1,2
wi log(vi − ci) (3)
subject to Ax+ b1v1 + b2v2 ≤ e
for i = 1, 2 : vi ≥ 0
x ≥ 0
where A is an m× n matrix, x is a vector consisting of allocation and auxiliary variables, say
n in number, and b1, b2,e are m-dimensional vectors.
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We will say that G is succinct if all the entries in A, b1, b2 are polynomially bounded in m and
n. The subclass of LNB2 consisting of all succinct games will be called SLNB2.
4 Some Representative 2-Player Games
In this section, we provide representative games for the 3 classes defined above. We will study
all 3 games in detail in this paper.
4.1 The game DG2
The game DG2 lies in SLNB2. We are given a directed graph G = (V,E), with ce ∈ Q
+ speci-
fying the capacity of edge e ∈ E. Two source-sink pairs are also specified, (s1, t1) and (s2, t2).
Each source-sink pair represents a player in the game and has its own disagreement utility (flow
value) ci, for i = 1, 2. In the nonsymmetric version, we are also given the clouts w1 and w2 of
the two players. The object is to find the Nash or nonsymmetric bargaining solution. Let G
denote the given instance of DG22.
Next, we give a convex program that captures the solution to G. The flow going from si to ti will
be referred to as commodity i, for i = 1, 2, and fi will denote the total flow of commodity i. For
each edge e ∈ E, we have 2 variables, f1e and f
2
e which denote the amount of each commodity
flowing through e. The constraints ensure that the total flow going through an edge does not
exceed its capacity and that for each commodity, at each vertex, other than the source-sink pair
of this commodity, flow conservation holds. For vertex v ∈ V , out(v) = {(v, u) | (v, u) ∈ E} and
in(v) = {(u, v) | (u, v) ∈ E}. The constraints of this program are simply ensuring that (f1, f2)
lies in the feasible set N .
maximize
∑
i=1,2
wi log(fi − ci) (4)
subject to for i = 1, 2 : fi =
∑
e∈out(s1)
f ie
∀e ∈ E : f1e + f
2
e ≤ ce
for i = 1, 2 : ∀v ∈ V − {si, ti} :
∑
e∈in(v)
f ie =
∑
e∈out(v)
f ie
for i = 1, 2 : ∀e ∈ E : f ie ≥ 0
4.2 The game ADNB2
The game ADNB2 lies in (LNB2 - SLNB2). To define it, we first need to define the game
ADNB, introduced in [Vaz09]. This game was derived from the linear case of the Arrow-
Debreu model, which differs from Fisher’s linear case in that each agent comes to the market
not with money but with an initial endowment of goods. We first state it formally.
2Note that there will be no confusion in using “c” to denote capacities of edges as well as disagreement utilities
of players since in the former case, the subscript will always be e and in the latter case, it will be 1, 2 or i.
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Let B = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a set of agents and G = {1, 2, . . . , g} be a set of divisible goods. We
will assume w.l.o.g. that there is a unit amount of each good. Let uij be the utility derived by
agent i on receiving one unit of good j; w.l.o.g., we will assume that uij is integral. If xij is the
amount of good j that agent i gets, for 1 ≤ j ≤ g, then the total utility derived by her is
vi(x) =
∑
j∈G
uijxij .
Finally, we assume that each agent has an initial endowment of these goods; the total amount
of each good possessed by the agents is 1 unit. The question is to find prices for these goods so
that if each agent sells her entire initial endowment at these prices and uses the money to buy
an optimal bundle of goods, the market clears.
W.l.o.g. we may assume that each good is desired by at least one agent and each agent desires
at least one good, i.e.,
∀j ∈ G, ∃i ∈ B : uij > 0 and ∀i ∈ B, ∃j ∈ G : uij > 0.
If not, we can remove the good or the agent from consideration.
In [Vaz09], we explored a different solution concept for this setting: for each agent i, compute
the utility she accrues from her initial endowment, say ci. Let N in R
n
+ denote the set of all
possible utility vectors obtained by distributing the goods among the agents in all possible ways.
Now seek the Nash bargaining solution for instance (N , c). The setup was made more general
by assuming that ci’s are arbitrary numbers given with the problem instance, i.e., they do not
come from initial endowments.
Let ADNB2 denote the restriction of this game to 2 players. We will assume these are non-
symmetric games, i.e., we are also given the clout, w1 and w2 of the two players. We give
a combinatorial strongly polynomial algorithm for this game; the algorithm in [Vaz09] is not
strongly polynomial.
The bargaining solution to ADNB2 is the optimal solution to the following convex program:
maximize
∑
i=1,2
wi log(vi − ci) (5)
subject to ∀i = 1, 2 : vi =
∑
j∈G
uijxij
∀j ∈ G :
∑
i=1,2
xij ≤ 1
∀i = 1, 2, ∀j ∈ G : xij ≥ 0
4.3 The circle game
The circle game lies in (NB2 - LNB2). Its feasible set is the intersection of the unit disk with
the positive orthant. We will consider only its Nash bargaining version. Its convex program is:
maximize
∑
i=1,2
log(vi − ci) (6)
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subject to v21 + v
2
2 ≤ 1
∀i = 1, 2 : vi ≥ 0
5 Fisher and Eisenberg-Gale Market Models
We will first state Fisher’s market model for the case of linear utility functions [BS00]. Consider
a market consisting of a set of n buyers B = {1, 2, . . . , n}, and a set of g divisible goods,
G = {1, 2, . . . , g}; we may assume w.l.o.g. that there is a unit amount of each good. Let mi be
the money possessed by buyer i, i ∈ B; w.l.o.g. assume that each mi > 0. Let uij be the utility
derived by buyer i on receiving one unit of good j. Thus, if xij is the amount of good j that
buyer i gets, for 1 ≤ j ≤ g, then the total utility derived by i is
vi(x) =
g∑
j=1
uijxij .
The problem is to find prices p = {p1, p2, . . . , pg} for the goods so that when each buyer is given
her utility maximizing bundle of goods, the market clears, i.e., each good having a positive price
is exactly sold, without there being any deficiency or surplus. Such prices are called market
clearing prices or equilibrium prices.
The following is the Eisenberg-Gale convex program. Using KKT conditions, one can show that
its optimal solution is an equilibrium allocation for Fisher’s linear market and the Lagrange
variables corresponding to the inequalities give equilibrium prices of goods (e.g., see Theorem
5.1 in [Vaz07]).
maximize
∑
i∈B
mi log vi (7)
subject to ∀i ∈ B : vi =
∑
j∈G
uijxij
∀j ∈ G :
∑
i∈B
xij ≤ 1
∀i ∈ B, ∀j ∈ G : xij ≥ 0
Next, we state the definition of Eisenberg-Gale markets as given in [JV08]. Let us say that a
convex program is an Eisenberg-Gale-type convex program if its objective function is of the form
max
∑
i∈B
mi log vi,
subject to linear packing constraints, i.e., constraints of the form ≤ in which all coefficients
and the r.h.s. are non-negative. Let M be a Fisher market, with an arbitrary utility function,
whose set of feasible allocations and buyers’ utilities are captured by a polytope Π. We will
assume that the linear constraints defining Π are packing constraints. As a result, M satisfies
the free disposal property, i.e., if v is a feasible utility vector then so is any vector dominated
by v. We will say that an allocation x1, . . . , xn made to the buyers is a clearing allocation if it
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uses up all goods exactly to the extent they are available in M. Finally, we will say that M is
an Eisenberg-Gale market if any clearing allocation x1, . . . , xn that maximizes
max
∑
i∈B
mi log vi(xi)
is an equilibrium allocation, i.e., there are prices p1, . . . pg for the goods such that for each buyer
i, xi is a utility maximizing bundle for i at these prices. The class EG(2), defined in [CDV06],
is essentially the restriction of Eisenberg-Gale markets to the case of 2 buyers; see [CDV06] for
the precise definition.
6 The Feasible Polytope and Some Basic Procedures
Let G be a game in LNB2 whose solution is captured by convex program (3). We can test if G
is feasible by solving the following LP:
maximize t (8)
subject to v1 ≥ c1 + t
v2 ≥ c2 + t
subject to Ax+ b1v1 + b2v2 ≤ e
x ≥ 0
Now, G is feasible iff the optimal value of t > 0. Henceforth, assume that G is feasible.
Next, we make the following change of variables,
for i = 1, 2 : yi = vi − ci,
hence obtaining the following program which is equivalent to (3).
maximize
∑
i=1,2
wi log yi (9)
subject to Ax+ b1(y1 + c1) + b2(y2 + c2) ≤ e
for i = 1, 2 : yi ≥ 0
x ≥ 0
Henceforth, we will denote (e− c1b1− c2b2) by d. We will denote by Π the polyhedron in R
n+2
which is defined by the constraints of program (9). In this paper, we will write the constraints
of (9) concisely as follows. This notation will also be used for LP’s optimizing over the polytope
Π.
maximize
∑
i=1,2
wi log yi (10)
subject to (x, y1, y2) ∈ Π
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The projection of Π onto the coordinates y1, y2 gives a polytope, N in R
2, which we will call
the feasible polytope; since G is feasible, this polytope is full dimensional. In this section, we will
describe its useful facets, i.e., facets on which the solution to game G can lie, and we will give
some basic procedures for operating on these facets.
We first compute the point (l1, l2) by first maximizing y1 over Π to get l1 and then maximizing
y2 over Π, subject to y1 = l1, to get l2. Similarly, compute the point (h1, h2) by first maximizing
y2 over Π to get h2 and then maximizing y1 over Π, subject to y2 = h2, to get h1. Clearly, both
these points are vertices of N . Finally, the set of facets encountered in moving, on the boundary
of N , from (l1, l2) to (h1, h2), by increasing the second coordinate are the useful facets.
Each of the useful facets has the form
y1 + αy2 ≤ β,
where α > 0 and β > 0. We will denote the vertex at the intersection of the two facets
y1 + α1y2 ≤ β1 and y1 + α2y2 ≤ β2,
by (α1, α2); we will assume α1 < α2.
Let α1 and α2 be the α values of the first and last facets encountered in moving from (l1, l2)
to (h1, h2); clearly, α
1 < α2. Our binary search will be performed on the interval [α1, α2]. In
Procedure 3 below, we show how to compute α1 and α2.
The solution to G must lie on a face which is either a useful facet or a vertex at the intersection
of 2 useful facets. These 2 possibilities give rise to distinct procedures and proofs throughout.
6.1 Procedure 1: Given α, find the face it lies on
We give an algorithm for the following task: Given a number α s.t. α1 ≤ α ≤ α2, determine
which of the following possibilities holds:
1. α defines a facet of N , y1 + αy2 ≤ β, for a suitable value of β. If so, find this facet.
2. There is a vertex of N , (α1, α2), such that α1 < α < α2. If so, find this vertex.
First solve the following LP and let its optimal objective function value be denoted by β and
let a and b denote the optimal values of y1 and y2, respectively.
maximize y1 + αy2 (11)
subject to (x, y1, y2) ∈ Π
Having computed β, solve the following LP and let its objective function value be denoted by
a1.
minimize y1 (12)
subject to y1 + αy2 = β
(x, y1, y2) ∈ Π
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Next, change the objective in LP (12) to maximize y1, and let its optimal objective function
value be a2. If a1 < a2, we are in the first case. Define b1 = (β − a1)/α and b2 = (β − a2)/α.
Then, the endpoints of the facet y1 + αy2 = β are (a1, b1) and (a2, b2). Otherwise, a1 = a2 = a,
say, and we are in the second case. Let b be the value of y2 computed in LP (12). Then, the
vertex has coordinates (a, b).
Next, we need to find α1 and α2 for this vertex. Let us begin by writing the dual for LP (11).
minimize
∑
j
djpj (13)
subject to
∑
j
b1jpj ≥ 1
∑
j
b2jpj ≥ α
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n :
∑
j
Ajipj ≥ 0
for 1 ≤ j ≤ m : pj ≥ 0
Let (x∗, y∗1 , y
∗
2) be an optimal solution to LP (11). Since G has been assumed to be feasible,
y∗1 > 0 and y
∗
2 > 0. The next LP is derived from LP (13) by adding constraints on pj which are
implied by the complementary slackness conditions of the primal and dual pair of LP’s (11) and
(13). It is not optimizing any function, since we are only concerned with its feasible solutions.
∑
j
b1jpj = 1 (14)
∑
j
b2jpj = r
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n :
∑
j
Ajipj ≥ 0
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n s.t. x∗i > 0 :
∑
j
Ajipj = 0
for 1 ≤ j ≤ m s.t.
∑
i
Ajix
∗
i + bijy
∗
1 + b2jy
∗
2 < dj : pj = 0
for 1 ≤ j ≤ m : pj ≥ 0
The next lemma follows from the complementary slackness conditions of the primal and dual
pair of LP’s (11) and (13).
Lemma 2 {α | LP (11) attains its optimal solution at (a, b)}
= {r | ∃ a feasible solution to LP (14) in which
∑
j b2jpj = r}.
Proof : Let A and B denote the sets on the l.h.s. and r.h.s. of the equality, respectively.
Let f ∈ A. Clearly, (x∗, a, b) is an optimal solution to LP (11) with α substituted by f . Let p∗
be an optimal solution to LP (13). Since p∗ satisfies all complementary slackness conditions of
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LP’s (11) and (13), it is a feasible solution to LP (14) with r replaced by f . Hence f ∈ B and
A ⊆ B.
The reverse inclusion follows in a similar manner, again using complementary slackness condi-
tions of LP’s (11) and (13). ✷
By Lemma 2, we can obtain α1 and α2 as follows. First, minimize r subject to the constraints
of LP (14); this gives α1. Next, maximize r subject to the constraints of LP (14); this gives α2.
6.2 Procedure 2: Given (a, b), find the face it lies on
Given a point (a, b) on the boundary of N , we give a procedure for finding the facet or vertex it
lies on. First, solve LP (15) for finding a feasible allocation gives the 2 buyers utilities of y1 = a
and y2 = b.
y1 = a (15)
y2 = b
(x, y1, y2) ∈ Π
Next, solve the minimization and maximization versions, with objective function r, of LP (14)
to find α1 and α2, respectively. If α1 = α2 = α, (a, b) lies on the facet y1 + αy2 ≤ a + αb.
Otherwise, α1 < α2 and (a, b) lies on the vertex (α1, α2).
6.3 Procedure 3: Computing α1 and α2
We now show how to compute α1 and α2, defined at the beginning of this section. As stated
there, our binary search will be performed on the interval [α1, α2].
First, use Procedure 2 to find the vertex, say (α1, α2), on which (l1, l2) lies. Set, α
1 ← α1. Next,
use Procedure 2 to find the vertex, say (α1, α2), on which (h1, h2) lies. Set, α
2 ← α2.
7 Binary Search on Parameter z
We first give some crucial definitions. Let (f1, f2) be the solution to game G. For player i define
γi =
fi
mi
.
Define parameter z to be
z =
γ1
γ2
.
The next lemma relates z to the point where the solution lies.
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Lemma 3 If the solution to game G lies on:
1. the facet y1 + αy2 ≤ β, then z = α.
2. the vertex (α1, α2), then α1 < z < α2.
Proof : In the first case, the objective function of the convex program (4),
g = w1 log y1 + w2 log y2
must be tangent to the facet at the solution point, say (a, b). Equating the ratio of the partial
derivatives of g and the line y1 + αy2 = β w.r.t. y2 and y1, we get
a/w1
b/w2
= α.
But the l.h.s. is γ1/γ2 = z, thereby giving z = α.
In the second case, the tangent to g at the solution must be intermediate between the slopes of
the adjacent facets, giving α1 < z < α2. ✷
Our algorithm will conduct a binary search on z, on the interval [α1, α2], to find the right face
on which the solution lies. The test given in the next lemma helps determine, in each iteration,
if the current face is the right.
Lemma 4 1. The solution to game G lies on the facet y1+αy2 ≤ β, having endpoints (a1, b1)
and (a2, b2), with a1 < a2, iff
w1
w1 + w2
∈
[
a1
β
,
a2
β
]
.
2. The solution to market M lies on the vertex (α1, α2), having coordinates (a, b), which is
at the intersection of facets y1 + α1y2 ≤ β1 and y1 + α2y2 ≤ β2, iff
w1
w1 + w2
∈
(
a
β2
,
a
β1
)
.
Proof : In the first case, substituting wi = fi/γi and α = γ1/γ2 (this follows from Lemma
3), we get
w1
w1 + w2
=
f1
f1 + αf2
=
f1
β
∈
[
a1
β
,
a2
β
]
.
For the other direction, if w1/(w1 + w2) lies in the interval given, then by the equation given
above, f1 ∈ [a1, a2], thereby showing that the solution lies on the facet y1 + αy2 ≤ β.
In the second case, by Lemma 3, γ1/γ2 ∈ (α1, α2), and this leads to the interval in which
w1/(w1 + w2) lies. The proof of the other direction also follows in the same manner. ✷
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The operation in Step 2 in Algorithm 6, ⌊x⌋κ, truncates x to accuracy 2
−κ where κ is defined
in the proof of Lemma 5.
Lemma 5 Binary search executes polynomial in n iterations.
Proof : First, we place an upper bound on the size of the interval [α1, α2]. By Cramer’s
rule, the number of bits in the solution to LP (14) is polynomial in n. Let this number be κ.
Therefore, for each of the facets, α can be written in κ bits. However, we do not know where
the binary point lies. So, let us assume that we will only deal with 2κ bit long numbers, with κ
bits before and κ bits after the binary point. The operation in Step 2 in Algorithm 6, ⌊x⌋κ, is
meant to truncate x to this form. Therefore, the size of the interval is bounded by 22κ. Hence
binary search will execute O(κ), i.e., polynomial in n iterations. ✷
Algorithm 6 (Binary Search)
1. (Initialization:) l ← α1 and h ← α2.
Let r←
w1
w1 + w2
.
2. α ← ⌊
l + h
2
⌋κ.
3. Using Procedure 1 (Section 6.1), determine if α lies on:
Case 1: A facet, say y1 + αy2 ≤ β, with endpoints (a1, b1) and (a2.b2).
If r < (a2/β) then l ← α and go to step 2.
Else if r > (a1/β) then h ← α and go to step 2.
Else if r ∈
[
a1
β
,
a2
β
]
, then solve the following 2 equations for y1 and y2 :
y1 + αy2 = β and
y1/w1
y2/w2
= α.
If the solution is y1 = a, y2 = b, output the solution to game G:
v1 = a+ c1 and v2 = b+ c2, and HALT.
Case 2: A vertex, say (α1, α2), with coordinates (a, b),
If r ≤ (a/β2) then l ← α2 and go to step 2.
Else if r ≥ (a/β1) then h ← α1 and go to step 2.
Else if r ∈
(
a
β2
,
a
β1
)
,
then output the solution to game G: v1 = a+ c1 and v2 = b+ c2, and HALT.
4. End.
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Lemma 7 Algorithm 6 performs binary search correctly.
Proof : We first justify restricting search to α-values in the range [α1, α2], i.e., the faces
encountered on the boundary of N in moving from (l1, l2) to (h1, h2) by increasing the socond
coordinate, as stated in Section 6. Observe that starting at (l1, l2) and moving in the other
direction on the boundary of N , the second coordinate must decrease and the first either remains
the same or decreases, hence decreasing the objective function value of (3). Similarly, moving
beyond (h1, h2) on the boundary of N , the first coordinate must decrease and the second either
remains the same or decreases, again decreasing the objective function value of (3).
By the necessary and sufficient conditions established in Lemma 4, the algorithm can determine
if the current face is the right one or not. Next, observe that value of w1/(w1 + w2) decreases
monotonically in moving from (l1, l2) to (h1, h2) on the boundary of N . With this observation,
one can check that if the current face is not the right one, in each case, the algorithm moves to
the side of this face that contains the right face. ✷
Hence we get:
Theorem 8 Every game in LNB2 has a rational solution; moreover, such a solution can be
found in polynomial time using only an LP solver.
Next assume that the coefficients in the constraints of convex program (3) are “small”, i.e., poly-
nomially bounded in n. Then all LP’s that need to be solved will also have “small” coefficients
(the objective function and right hand side don’t need to be “small”). Such LP’s can be solved
in strongly polynomial time [Tar86]. By Lemma 5, binary search will execute only polynomial
in n iterations. Hence we get:
Theorem 9 Every game in SLNB2 can be solved in strongly polynomial time.
In particular, the game DG2, which lies in SLNB2, can be solved in strongly polynomial time.
[JV08] give examples of Eisenberg-Gale markets with 3 buyers which do not have rational so-
lutions. Hence, instances of the corresponding Nash bargaining games, with zero disagreement
utilities, do not possess rational solutions; this includes the modification of DG2 to a 3-player
game, with 3 source-sink pairs.
8 A Strongly Polynomial Algorithm for the Game ADNB2
We first give the notion of a flexible budget market, introduced in [Vaz09]. This is a natural
variant on a Fisher market – the main difference is that instead of having a fixed amount of
money to spend in the market, buyers have a (strict) lower bound on the amount of utility they
wish to derive, and at any given prices, they want to derive it in the most cost-effective manner.
Thus, the money spent by buyers is a function of prices of goods. The object again is to find
market clearing or equilibrium prices.
Next, we give a precise definition of the flexible budget market, M, that ADNB2 reduces to
(the reduction, derived by applying KKT conditions, appears in Theorem 4 in [Vaz09]). The
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goods and utility functions of the two buyers are as inADNB2 and each buyer i has a parameter
ci giving a strict lower bound on the amount of utility she wants to derive. Given prices p for
the goods, define the maximum bang-per-buck of buyer i to be
γi = maxj
{
uij
pj
}
.
Now, the amount of money buyer i spends is defined to be
mi = 1 +
ci
γi
.
8.1 The algorithm
We will first renumber the goods. Compute u1j/u2j for each good j, sort the goods in decreasing
order of this ratio and partition by equality. For the purpose of this algorithm, it will suffice to
replace each partition by one good. Consider a partition and compute minj{u1j} for goods j in
this partition. Assume the minimum is attained by u1k. Then the utilities of the two players for
this new good, say g′ will be u1k and u2k, respectively. Next, we need to compute the number of
units of g′ that are available. Each good j in the partition will be represented by u1j/u1k units
of g′. The sum over all goods in the partition is the total number of units of this good. Let us
assume that after this transformation, we have n goods available, 1, 2, . . . , n and the amount of
good j is bj and the goods are numbered in decreasing order of u1j/u2j .
Next, we test for feasibility, i.e., we need to determine whether the two players can be given
baskets providing c1 and c2 utility, respectively, without exhausting all goods. Clearly, the most
efficient way of doing this is to give player 1 goods from the lowest index and to give player 2
goods from the highest index. Assume that player 1 needs to be given all the available goods
1, 2, . . . k1 − 1 and an amount x of good k1 in order to make up c1 utility. Next, assume that
player 2 needs to be given all available goods n, n − 1, . . . , k2 + 1 and an amount y of good k2
to make up c2 utility. Then, the game and the market are feasible iff k1 < k2 or k1 = k2 and
x+ y < bk1 .
Finally, assume that the given market is feasible and let us find an equilibrium for it. Since each
buyer must get a utility maximizing bundle of goods, for each good j that is allocated to player
i,
γi =
uij
pj
and for each good j that is not allocated to player i,
γi ≥
uij
pj
.
This leads to two cases for the equilibrium allocation:
• Case 1: There is a k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n such that player 1 gets goods 1, 2, . . . , k and player 2
gets goods k + 1, k + 2, . . . , n.
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• Case 2: There is a k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n such that player 1 gets goods 1, 2, . . . , k − 1, player 2
gets goods k + 1, k + 2, . . . , n, and they both share good k.
Since the equilibrium prices are unique, only one of these O(n) possibilities holds. We will check
them all to determine which one it is.
Case 1: Let G1 consist of the first k good and G2 consist of the rest. Then,
γ1 =
u1j
pj
for j ∈ G1 and γ2 =
u2j
pj
for j ∈ G2.
Let γ1 = 1/x and γ2 = 1/y. The total money spent by player 1 is
m1 =
∑
j∈G1
pjbj = x
∑
j∈G1
u1jbj = w1 + c1x.
Similarly, the total money spent by player 2 is
m2 =
∑
j∈G2
pjbj = y
∑
j∈G2
u2jbj = w2 + c2y.
Solve these equations for x and y and compute the prices of goods pj . If with these prices, each
player gets a utility maximizing bundle of goods, i.e., the 2 conditions given above hold, these
are equilibrium prices and allocations.
Case 2: Since good k is allocated to both buyers,
γ1 =
u1k
pk
and γ2 =
u2k
pk
.
Let u1k/u2k = α and γ1 = 1/x. Then γ2 = 1/(αx). Let G1 consist of the first k good and G2
consist of the rest. Then the total money spent by both players is
m1 +m2 =
∑
j∈G
pjbj = x(
∑
j∈G1
u1jbj +
∑
j∈G2
αu2jbj) = w1 + c1x+w2 + c2αx.
Again, solve for x, compute prices of goods and check if the conditions for equilibrium are
satisfied.
Observe that ADNB2 is not in SLNB2, since the uij ’s are not restriced to be polynomially
bounded in n. Even so, we get:
Theorem 10 There is a combinatorial strongly polynomial algorithm for solving ADNB2.
9 The Circle Game
Using the KKT conditions of (6) it is easy to show that the Nash bargaining solution (x, y)
satisfies the following equations:
(2y2 − c2y − 1)
2 = c21(1− y
2) and x2 + y2 = 1.
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On the other hand, the problem also has a simple geometric solution. Let Q be the point on the
unit circle in the positive orthant. Let O denote the origin and P denote the point (c1, c2). Let
θ1 be the angle made by PQ with the x-axis and θ2 be the angle made by OQ with the y-axis.
Proposition 11 Q is the Nash bargaining solution iff θ1 = θ2.
Proof : Let (a, b) be the point Q and let R be the intersection of the vertical line passing
through Q and the horizontal line passing through P. Then the angle QPR is θ1.
The slope of the tangent to the hyperbola (x − c1)(y − c2) = α at (x, y), which is obtained by
taking ratio of partial derivatives w.r.t. y and x, is
y − c2
x− c1
.
From the triangle PQR we get that
tan θ1 =
b− c2
a− c1
.
The slope of the tangent to the circle at Q is tan θ2.
By Nash’s theorem, Q is the Nash bargaining solution iff the hyperbola (x− c1)(y − c2) = α is
tangent to the unit circle at point Q, for a suitable value of α. Hence, by the above-stated facts,
Q is the Nash bargaining solution iff θ1 = θ2. ✷
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